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  I.-112 
THERE’S FEMINISM IN THOSE 
JUDGMENTS  
ANITA BERNSTEIN* 
Abstract: This Essay enlists the other contributions to this Symposium to honor 
the extraordinary transnational phenomenon of Feminist Judgments, a growing 
set of multi-authored volumes that find progressive potential in decisional law. 
Although The Common Law Inside the Female Body is a very different work, this 
Essay identifies common ground between this book and Feminist Judgments. The 
modus operandi of Feminist Judgments is to rewrite published judicial decisions 
to steer their results or their rationales in a feminist direction; The Common Law 
Inside the Female Body celebrates judge-made law as it is, in an unaltered state. 
That difference noted, the Feminist Judgments movement and my paean to the 
common law agree on where to go and what to take on the journey. Both share a 
commitment to reason, precedent, narrative, judge-written primary materials, 
grievances articulated and heard in court, fidelity to the rule of law, and undoing 
the subordination of women. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Boston College Law Review Electronic Supplement’s editorial deci-
sion to lay out the essays of this Symposium in neutral alphabetical order by 
author, with only the introduction and this response as exceptions—Crawford 
and Bernstein would otherwise have landed in the middle of the list—opens a 
question of how to read these works in the aggregate. My title here, “There’s 
Feminism in Those Judgments,” has a layout in mind. It works with the multi-
national, multi-volume, multi-authored, multi-year ongoing project called 
Feminist Judgments.1 
I’ve been inspired by Feminist Judgments before. A reference to it begins 
another law review article of mine in which I read decisional law by the es-
teemed federal judge Jack B. Weinstein as feminist jurisprudence.2 In that 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2020, Anita Bernstein. All rights reserved. 
 * Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
 1 For an overview of the American subset of Feminist Judgments, see U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS 
PROJECT, U. NEV. WILLIAM S. BOYD L.S, https://law.unlv.edu/us-feminist-judgments [https://perma.cc/
NNN6-FC2S] [hereinafter Judgments Project]; see also FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPIN-
IONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, & Bridget J. 
Crawford eds., 2016). 
 2 Anita Bernstein, The Feminist Jurisprudence of Jack B. Weinstein, 64 DE PAUL L. REV. 341, 
341 (2015) [hereinafter Bernstein, Feminist Jurisprudence]. 
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piece I described the judge’s reaction to this recharacterization of his corpus, 
an assessment he never asked for and did not set out to acquire.3 Judge Wein-
stein had his own characterization of “the ideology” behind his decisions, 
which he brought up unprompted during a 2014 phone call. “The individual 
. . . gets her due,” Weinstein said. “She should be able to look to the courts to 
get her protection.”4 
Feminist Judgments pursues that same goal. As reviewed in a Time maga-
zine story, this initiative commits “the power of the imagination” toward “har-
nessing the legal process to remedy centuries of bias, exclusion, and injus-
tice.”5 Its power comes from outside the authority of an official court. 
Readers may be familiar with the jurisprudential method of the initiative. 
Joining an edited volume that addresses a particular subcategory of case law, 
writers rewrite published judicial decisions. Each rewrite hews to the facts and 
procedural history present in the original. Writers also are stuck with con-
straints present at the time in that they may not cite anything newer than the 
decision they are changing. Feminist Judgments authors are free, however—
more than free, they are encouraged—to stray from the precedent they return 
to in two respects: its result and its rationale. 
Scholars thus re-envision a disappointing, benighted, or incomplete judi-
cial decision as an instrument of progress. “When they write feminist judg-
ments (using feminist perspectives or methods to produce revised versions of 
actual court opinions),” as three leaders of the initiative explain this work, 
“feminist authors translate feminist theory into the language of law practice 
and judging.”6 Later in this description of their project, these leaders make a 
point that I find welcoming to both my characterization of my beloved Judge 
as a creator of feminist jurisprudence and what I contended in The Common 
Law Inside the Female Body. Linda Berger, Bridget Crawford, and Kathryn 
Stanchi make their point with reference to a rewrite by Deborah Rhode in their 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Court. 
Rhode chose Johnson v. Transportation Agency,7 in which a man com-
plained that sex-based affirmative action stood between him and a job promo-
tion he’d wanted.8 Paul Johnson, employed by Santa Clara County in northern 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. at 342 n.12 (stating that Judge Weinstein was “gracious and a little bemused” by the thought 
of his having written feminist jurisprudence). I am one of the judge’s former law clerks. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Judgments Project, supra note 1 (referencing a Time Magazine sidebar from 2015).  
 6 Bridget J. Crawford et al., Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect 
the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 168 (2018). 
 7 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 625 (1987); Deborah Gordon, Commentary on 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, in FEMINIST JUDGEMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 1, at 327. 
 8 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625. 
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California, had applied to be a road dispatcher. The county gave this job to the 
only female applicant, Diane Joyce, a woman who had scored two points lower 
than him on a set of numerical criteria.9 
Deborah Rhode, in her Feminist Judgments rewrite of the opinion, re-
fused to agree that the scorecard that rated Johnson better than Joyce—an 
amalgam that put seniority, relevant experience, evaluations by managers, and 
performance at interviews into a single integer—accurately measured the can-
didates’ relative merits.10 This disagreement with “the real” Johnson notwith-
standing, Rhode wrote her decision as an Opinion for the Court that went 
along with the 6-3 result in favor of the defendant agency; she did not offer a 
dissent or concurrence.11 
A very different path ended at the same result, in other words. Both the 
real case and the Rhode version came out in favor of Diane Joyce and her em-
ployer. Moreover, “Rhode’s feminist critique fits seamlessly into the original 
opinion in Johnson, parts of which she left intact,” the Feminist Judgments 
editors observed, continuing with a conclusion:12 “The effect of this pastiche 
of feminist rewrite combined with the original opinion is noteworthy in that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to tell which sections of the feminist rewrite of 
Johnson are the words of the original Court and which are Rhode’s.”13 
I. A VIEW OF WHAT “FEMINIST JUDGMENTS” CAN INCLUDE 
The decision that Justice William Brennan wrote for the Johnson Court, 
signed by five of his colleagues and concurred in by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, is not itself a feminist judgment, but it is something that a feminist 
jurist can build on. If Deborah Rhode had had a seat on the Court in the Term 
that started in October 1986, she and the other Justices in the majority would 
be disagreeing not on who ought to win but on how to support the outcome 
they all favored. One can imagine a conversation in chambers between Bren-
nan as leader of the Court’s liberal wing (we have noted that Feminist Judg-
ments sticks with historical reality as much as it can) and Associate Justice 
Rhode about the possibility of signing the same opinion.14  
If that prospect had failed, the Justices would have negotiated which of 
the two routes to a shared end would fill the majority opinion and which rele-
gated to another concurrence. Brennan would have listened to Rhode just as 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Id. 
 10 Gordon, supra note 7, at 332. 
 11 Id. at 340. 
 12 Crawford et al., supra note 6, at 183. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 661 (2013) 
(noting Justic Brennan’s mastery of “getting to five”).  
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Rhode listened to Brennan to build her Johnson rewrite. Paul Johnson and San-
ta Clara County and even Diane Joyce probably would not notice the differ-
ence, but a different Johnson—a decision with a deeper feminist imprint—
would move into volume 480 of the United States Reports. 
Reasons to esteem Feminist Judgments abound;15 the one I embrace in 
this Essay, aided by the six pieces that precede mine, focuses on what the re-
writes in these volumes join. Decisional law at present contains judgments 
hostile to feminism, many more judgments that pay no attention to feminism, 
and every now and then a piece of judicial writing that moves a feminist agen-
da forward. To give one non-typical but illustrative example, the corpus of de-
cisions that I gathered in The Feminist Jurisprudence of Jack B. Weinstein in-
cludes decisions groupable under six gender-progressive umbrellas: attention 
to women of low income,16 sensitivity to the interests of female offenders be-
ing sentenced,17 women’s civil rights,18 “the woman’s constitution,”19 redress 
for women’s personal injury,20 and feminism beyond women, a group in which 
I included male litigants, children, and one transgender plaintiff whom an ex-
pert had characterized as “he/she” in a report.21 
The Weinstein sextet is not a definitive list of what feminism cares about: 
instead, it is my arrangement of the output of one judge who had not labeled 
himself a feminist or even a feminist ally. I was reminded of Judge Weinstein, 
and of the characterization he used to describe his work, when I read Ann 
Bartow in this Symposium.22 Many judge-written outcomes, Bartow says, “are 
driven by an unexamined but intense internal, personal sense of fairness.”23 
Feminist jurisprudence also wants to achieve fairness. Like other social justice 
movements, this one makes connections with persons who do not identify them-
selves as members. 
To have an impact, a Feminist Judgment revisit needs some purchase in 
the rock it climbs, some commitments that will interest and might persuade 
fairness-minded readers. That an attentive reader of the Rhode’s Johnson re-
write cannot be sure where Brennan ends and Rhode begins means there must 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See generally Judgment Projects, supra note 5 (gathering accolades). 
 16 Bernstein, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 343. 
 17 Id. at 346. 
 18 Id. at 348. 
 19 Id. at 353 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Women’s Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447).  
 20 Id. at 358. 
 21 Id. at 360, 363. With this sixth grouping I did not make a claim about the gender of litigants but 
instead claimed that feminism in this set of Weinstein-authored decisions extends beyond women. 
 22 Id. at 342 n.12 (describing Judge Weinstein as “gracious and a little bemused” by the thought 
of his having written feminist jurisprudence).  
 23 Ann Bartow, The Female Legal Realist Inside the Common Law, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-85 
(2020). 
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be something hospitable to Rhode in the Brennan original. Even a case that 
gets ground up by a feminist jurist can be grist for a progressive mill.24 The 
rewritten judicial decision probably does not look exactly like feminism, but it 
is feminist-adjacent when another jurist concerned with progress on this front 
can engage this hospitality. The Rhode revision of Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, in borrowing language literally and intelligibly from the real actual 
decision to construct a separate judicial decision without visible seams, 
demonstrates unity as well as divergence. Once a source is feminist-adjacent—
able to accept a feminist perspective in the sense of agreeing about arguments, 
factual material, and analogies that matter—it becomes accurate, or at least 
defensible, to say there is feminism in that source. 
The (in)famous continuity of the common law, which I cheerfully admit 
can and does retard progress, rests on the same common purpose among partic-
ipants in its work. Judges reach comfortably across centuries and oceans to cite 
a decision even when they would find its author off-putting or hard to talk to in 
person. Lawyers go to court with arguments fashioned out of simultaneously 
distant and pertinent precedents. Equally central to the common law, though 
less visible in published decisions, is the role of disanalogy, where a judge or 
advocate emphasizes difference rather than sameness between two conditions 
or cases.25 Practitioners of this methodology cite cases but also stand ready to 
distinguish them.   
Whether embracing an analogy or source or arguing against it, our pro-
tagonist cannot work alone. Common law lawmaking needs a community. 
Metaphors for it emphasize this connection to the experiences of other people. 
Nouns that writers have compared to the common law—a tree, a river, a web, 
bricolage—refer to durability derived from multiple inputs and the passage of 
time.26 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Bernstein, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 341. A rewrite in an early Feminist 
Judgments volume demolished an unsound decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. Jennifer Ko-
shan, Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 18 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 321 (2006). That 
case, which ruled against a group of working-class women, is not defensible in its result; I do not 
defend it here except as an example of the methodology I esteem in this Essay. 
 25 I used that word in the book when comparing slavery and coverture. ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE 
COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 25 (2019) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW 
INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY]. Then of course I found some similarities. 
 26 See, e.g., Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives on 
Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 104–05 (2012) (discussing “[a]ncestral [b]ricolage”); Isabelle 
Richard, Metaphors in English for Law: Let Us Keep Them!, LEXIS J. ENG. LEXICOLOGY, 2014, at 4–
6, 7–8, https://journals.openedition.org/lexis/251 [https://perma.cc/L7XR-GRR4] (noting the meta-
phors of “tree,” “river,” and “web”). 
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Music gives us another metaphor, call and response, as a way to think 
about both Feminist Judgments and the essays of this Symposium.27 Call and 
response starts with a phrase that gets answered after a pause; participants 
work in collaboration, playing distinct roles.28 Within Feminist Judgments, the 
first increment or call is the actual case, a historical reality that the rewrite re-
sponds to and problematizes. In this Symposium, three Essays identify what is 
wrong with the historical reality of the common law. We can think of those 
three as the Call. “Response” here comes from two other Essays. Our leader, 
who not by coincidence also happens to be a leader of the Feminist Judgments 
project, achieves a synthesis in her Introduction. 
II. THE CALL: SILBAUGH, DINNER, AND AHMAD . . .  
Writing with both despair and hope about the possibility of change, 
Katharine Silbaugh, Deborah Dinner, and Nadia Ahmad identify in their Es-
says conditions present in the common law that are not progressive. For 
Silbaugh, the worrisome condition is “social hierarchy.”29 “Patriarchy,” writes 
Dinner, contrasting this blight to Liberty.30 Ahmad has chosen an unexpected 
contrast, a phrase I want to call arresting: “the Central Park Five.”31 
Social hierarchy and patriarchy. Silbaugh and Dinner bring back to my 
mind a worry that I imagine must be common for writers who put forward con-
trarian theses: Disagreement with an apparent consensus might indicate that 
the person who disagrees is wrong. In the book I copped to self-questioning a 
couple of times. On its first page, my second sentence, I mentioned recurrent 
“surprise or polite skepticism” that I received in response to my suggestion 
that the common law functions to liberate women.32 When I asserted what 
readers seem to agree is the book’s boldest claim—that abortion really is “a 
common law liberty”33—I felt obliged to nod again in that direction: “If Ye 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Candace G. Hines, Note, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical Ten-
sions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463, 469–70 (2005) (arguing that African American traditions, call and 
response included, understand the creation of music as communal rather than the work of a solitary 
author). 
 28 Id. at 470–71. 
 29 Katharine Silbaugh, The Common Law Inside a Social Hierarchy: Power or Reason?, 61 
B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-105–11 (2020). 
 30 Deborah Dinner, Seeking Liberty, Finding Patriarchy: The Common Law’s Historical Legacy, 
61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-89–94 (2020). 
 31 Nadia B. Ahmad, Re-Reading Anita Bernstein’s The Common Law Inside the Female Body 
from the Perspective of the Central Park Five, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-69–81 (2020). 
 32 BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY, supra note 25, at 1. 
 33 See id. at 161 n.85 (citing Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Pe-
numbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of 
a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 336 (1971)). The United States Su-
preme Court cited the Means article in its 1973 decision Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 135 n.26 (1973). 
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Olde Common Law gives individuals a right to rid themselves of pregnancy, 
one would have expected to hear the news before now. As the cliché asks, 
where have you been?”34 Part of my last chapter purports to talk back to Jere-
my Bentham, the common law’s greatest antagonist, as among a set of inter-
locutors I felt I had “carried around on my mental shoulder.”35 
I found it easier to argue with a dead thinker about the relative merits of 
legislation and the common law than to assuage my misgiving that the com-
mon law might be at least as committed to social hierarchy and patriarchy as it 
is to the liberty of individuals of all genders. The stance I took on statutory law 
had the advantage of newer developments. For example, I daresay Jeremy 
Bentham would have been repelled by the Christmas 2017 tax bill that some 
Republicans in Congress voted for sight unseen, a piece of legislation on 
which I had enough time to throw shade before my publisher’s last deadline.36 
Social hierarchy, to use Silbaugh’s broader category, or patriarchy, to name the 
specific kind of social hierarchy that Dinner chose, is harder to gainsay. Debo-
rah Dinner rightly surmises that I do indeed “agree with some of [her] con-
cerns.”37 
From her expertise in American history Dinner is also correct, I think, to 
find patriarchy and racism twined together. Silbaugh expresses the same point 
and Nadia Ahmad, to whom I will soon turn, puts race at the center of her es-
say. But Dinner’s reference to “seeking liberty” and finding conditions that are 
just the opposite is especially succinct. Law as written by American judges in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sided with husbands over wives and 
with purported owners of human beings over the people they had violently en-
slaved. All the writers in this Symposium deserve my thanks for putting em-
phasis on this brute historical reality. 
The Central Park Five. When Nadia Ahmad observes that I did not use 
the title “The Common Law Inside the White Female Body,” she makes a val-
uable point that has occupied another post-monograph publication of mine 
about what I said in my book and did not say. A companion symposium pub-
lished at the end of last year gave me a chance to write up a kind of “The 
                                                                                                                           
 34 BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY, supra note 25, at 160. In an earli-
er iteration of this point I attributed Where Have You Been? to one individual. Anita Bernstein, Com-
mon Law Fundamentals of the Right to Abortion, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2015) (citing lyrics 
by Rihanna). 
 35 BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY, supra note 25, at 190. 
 36 Id. at 192 (“I feel sure that Jeremy Bentham would support changes to the Internal Revenue 
Code to follow other countries and simplify the payment of federal income tax. H&R Block and Intu-
it, seller of TurboTax, have spent millions each year keeping this reform a distant dream.”). 
 37 Dinner, supra note 30, at I.-94. 
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Common Law Inside the African American Female Body.”38 Regardless of 
what its merits may be, that essay, whose real title is Negative Liberty Meets 
Positive Social Change, certainly does not resolve the problem(s) of race pre-
sent in my book, for at least three reasons. First, when I contend that the com-
mon law can and does deliver negative liberty to women of color, I risk mis-
reading the record. “Whitewashing” comes to mind as a word for too much 
good cheer on that point. Second, I lack authority to speak about prospects for 
persons whose identity and experiences I do not share. Third, that essay exists 
outside the actual book. 
And so I mention Negative Liberty Meets Positive Social Change here for 
a narrower purpose, which is to identify an overlap in my thinking with the 
Ahmad thesis. On the subject of pregnancy and abortion, both Ahmad and I 
think that it is important to note that “[pregnant women of color face] greater 
morbidity and mortality than their white counterparts.”39 She and I make dif-
ferent uses of this datum, however. Ahmad reads it to say that “all women do 
not experience pregnancy and its consequences the same way.”40 I agree, but 
the racial difference I find of interest relates not to Ahmad’s broad and abstract 
“pregnancy and its consequences” but life and death for women of color as a 
fact on the ground. All American women, undivided by race, are much more 
likely to die in childbirth than they are to die of an abortion; on top of that, “the 
racial disparity in [American] maternal deaths is jaw-dropping.”41 Because ma-
ternal death threatens African American women more than white women, the 
common law liberty of abortion—which delivers shelter from a deadly risk—
holds urgent importance for members of a racial minority.42 
Referencing the Central Park Five makes a bold contribution to this Sym-
posium that I did not anticipate. I find Ahmad’s inclusion exciting and perti-
nent. The phrase refers to teenagers who in 1989 were arrested for an excep-
tionally violent, luridly publicized attack on a white woman, an attack that they 
did not commit and for which crime they were sentenced to prison. The expe-
rience of these now middle-aged men lies at the center of an acclaimed 2019 
film, “When They See Us,” that reported on their exoneration and vindication. 
DNA evidence pinned responsibility on a stranger to the five of them, an 
adult.43 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Anita Bernstein, Negative Liberty Meets Positive Social Change, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 
ONLINE 195 (2019), https://northwesternlawreview.org/articles/negative-liberty-meets-positive-social-
change/ [https://perma.cc/2ZLF-7DJC] [hereinafter Bernstein, Negative Liberty]. 
 39 Ahmad, supra note 31, at I.-76. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Bernstein, Negative Liberty, supra note 38, at 209 (quoting Michele Goodwin & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270, 1330 (2018)). 
 42 BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY, supra note 25, at 144. 
 43 See Ahmad, supra note 31, at I.-73–75.   
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Innocence and guilt, or exoneration and blame, come together in Ahmad’s 
reflections about the Central Park Five. Both the common law and I receive a 
bit of blame in her Essay. I shall defend both, though not with vehemence.44 
Did the personified entity I’ve been calling “the common law” hurt An-
tron McCaray, Kevin Richardson, Yusef Salaam, Raymond Santana, and Korey 
(then Kharey) Wise?45 Posing that question made my knee jerk, I admit. I want 
to say no. One need not be a Bernstein-level fan of the common law to assign 
more fault to other conditions: I would mention reliance on confessions by law 
enforcement, media indifference to black victims of violent crime, and a full-
page ad in all the big-circulation New York newspapers that influenced Central 
Park Five jurors by stoking fear and hatred.46 Nothing about precedent, judge-
written decisions, stare decisis, reasoning by analogy, or any other hallmark of 
the common law seems to me central to the miscarriage of justice that Ahmad 
connects to my book. 
On reflection, while I wouldn’t go so far as to agree that the common law 
was a Central Park Five malefactor, or that it “blocks entry to the United States 
by means of the ‘accident’ of immigrant deaths, not just detention and deporta-
tion,”47 I share in the disapproval that Ahmad expresses. The jurisprudence that 
                                                                                                                           
 44 I keep Ahmad’s criticism of the common law above the line and respond to the criticism of me 
down here in a footnote. When she wrote that in contrast to some scholars, who “propose that legal 
scholars should ‘avoid essentialism to achieve normative commitments to social transformation,’ 
Bernstein is more comfortable making broad generalizations about the operation of the system,” Ah-
mad applied “essentialism” to my book. Id. at I.-73. “Making broad generalizations” is different from 
the pejorative word I see used most often to condemn generalizations by women about women when 
these authors or works neglect race, class, sexual orientation, or another identifier that functions to 
distinguish or divide members of the group. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990). Certainly I have made my share of broad generali-
zations over the years, inside The Common Law Inside the Female Body and out, but I have also gone 
out of my way to abjure essentialism. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 201 (2012) (arguing in favor of variety and multiplicity); Anita Bernstein, Toward More 
Parsimony and Transparency in “The Essentials of Marriage,” 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 81, 85–86 
(expressing my concern about a belief present in judge-written law that rigidly conditions the freedom 
of individuals and couples to choose the terms of their marriages). Ahmad’s diction treated “pregnan-
cy and its consequences” as if it were a single thing with an essence, whereas in Negative Liberty 
Meets Positive Social Change I focused on the difference between African American deaths caused by 
childbirth and African American lives saved by abortion. Bernstein, Negative Liberty, supra note 38, 
at 209. 
 45 See Ahmad, supra note 31, at I.-73–74.  
 46 A law review article published more than a decade before the 2016 election noted the extreme 
vituperation that Donald Trump wrote into his high-priced speech about the case. N. Jeremi Duru, The 
Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1315, 1350–51 (2004) (quoting Trump’s words in the newspaper ad: “I want to hate [them]. They 
should be forced to suffer . . . . I am not looking to psychoanalyze them or understand them, I am 
looking to punish them.”). Stoked fear and hatred had an effect on the outcome. See id. at 1357–60 
(gathering evidence to support this proposition). 
 47 Ahmad, supra note 31, at I.-78.   
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I praise as a safeguard of negative liberty occupies itself at least as much with 
protecting hard-to-justify distributions of wealth, health, and safety. Ahmad 
implies that at some point the priorities of the common law become too objec-
tionable to tolerate without protest, and that its indifference to injustice might 
be an overt wrong. Her bottom line has merit. 
III. . . . AND A RESPONSE FROM INNISS AND BARTOW 
Lolita Buckner Inniss and Ann Bartow do not, at least in the eyes of this 
reader, disagree with the problem as described in the Essays I’ve grouped un-
der The Call, but they have something different to say about it. Inniss refer-
ences jurisprudence and history to situate The Common Law Inside the Female 
Body as in or near (though not “squarely among”) “the works of legal real-
ists.”48 That taxonomical move, which did not occur to me as author, returns 
when Ann Bartow expresses the same idea.49 
All three of us—Inniss and Bartow as nominators of this description and 
me, in reaction to it—know that legal realism has no unitary definition and few 
widely agreed-on criteria for inclusion under this aegis. In separate ways, how-
ever, the two of them both have in mind one foundational condition present in 
legal realism. Inniss quotes Brian Leiter to say that “tailored scenarios that 
demonstrated deep concern about fairness and justice in specific contexts were 
at the heart of the common law enterprise.”50 In contrast to Inniss, whose ex-
pression of this jurisprudential stance is more guarded, Bartow owns fairness 
overtly for herself:  
I consider myself a legal realist. I think that judges consider not only 
abstract rules, but also social interests, public policy, the personal 
characteristics of the parties, and a personal theory of justice when 
deciding a case. Some of this is done consciously, but many out-
come determinations are driven by an unexamined but intense inter-
nal, personal sense of fairness. Bernstein suggests that is a reason 
for optimism: Judges can be persuaded to be fair to women. Some-
times the common law will guide them to fairness with little fric-
tion. Other times, though, they have to engage in what Bernstein 
charmingly refers to as “handwaving.” The judges know the out-
come they think fairness requires, but struggle to explain it as the 
natural consequence of extant common law in the area. As a result, 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Lolita Buckner Inniss, (Un)Common Law and the Female Body, 61 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. I.-95, 
98 (2020). 
 49 Bartow, supra note 23, at I.-85.  
 50 Inniss, supra note 48, at I.-98.  
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they resort to deflection: “Look over here at my holding, isn’t it 
great? Don’t worry so much about how I reached it!”51 
This response to a call as articulated by the other three Essays says that 
the common law contains not only the pathologies insightfully described by 
Silbaugh, Dinner, and Ahmad, but also the seeds of its own repair. Common 
law judges partake of and reinforce the social ills around them but inside their 
job is an orientation toward being fair. Flexibility—a virtue that writers who 
are skeptical about legal realism call “indeterminacy” and worse52—enables 
the legal realist to act on that outlook. 
My own response to the call stakes out a spot of territory near that 
claimed by Bartow and Innis. While I agree with them that a large enough pro-
portion of judges try to treat persons in their courts with fairness, I think the 
work of a common law judge focuses more directly on integrity. Here I use this 
word to include its connotation of oneness. 
The integer, the singular litigant, stands at the center of the common law. 
This person was born or (alternatively it was formed out of paper, if it is the 
corporate kind of person) alone and will die (or will be dissolved) alone. It 
wins or loses and is heard or dismissed by itself. As a unique person, a plaintiff 
needs standing, which means a distinct individual stake in the outcome, to 
bring a common law claim. Notice and other procedural rights rendered in the 
common law tradition address defendants at this singular level. 
Recognition of a person, I argued in The Common Law Inside the Female 
Body, is what determines whether the common law can deliver what Inniss and 
Bartow call fairness to this participant. Here integrity in the sense of oneness—
treating like cases alike, heeding precedent because a current dispute is at one 
with an earlier iteration of the same conflict—delivers parity of experience to 
persons. To the common law we persons are the same, at least at a (very im-
portant) formal level. The common law says that she who possesses the status 
of a person possesses negative liberty. She may refuse to share and submit to 
the intrusions and demands that others would push upon and into her. When we 
persons insist on our indivisibility, we can call on the common law’s promise 
to have our back. 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Bartow, supra note 23, at I.-82–88.  
 52 See John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The 
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IV. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS INSIDE THE BODY OF THE COMMON LAW 
Concluding this Essay, I turn now to the description of this Symposium as 
presented by its leader. Bridget Crawford writes that she “invited colleagues 
with diverse interests, backgrounds and experiences to contribute to a collec-
tion of reflective essays. The authors include full-time faculty members with 
academic specialties in Torts, Intellectual Property, Legal History, Environ-
mental Law, Property, Family Law, and Constitutional Law. Scholars with dif-
ferent scholarly perspectives ask where (and whether) the common law can be 
understood as a strong ground for asserting women’s rights.”53 Crawford is 
right to focus on diversity because diversity is the point of a symposium. Had 
she wanted to confine her commentary on The Common Law Inside the Fe-
male Body to her own ideas, she would have published a review essay with a 
solitary byline. My focus on unity, noted earlier in this Essay and now with us 
again, does not disagree with Crawford but complements her work. 
Occasionally I venture to write about freedom of speech,54 and now, hav-
ing found connections between this Symposium and the Feminist Judgments 
project, I’m moved to say a few words on the subject here because Feminist 
Judgment rewrites of ‘real cases’ are (among many other things) significant 
expressions of opinion that contribute to what the First Amendment scholar 
Ronald Krotoszynski in a recent book has identified as a reason to value free 
speech, the pursuit of democratic self-government.55 Separately and together, 
expressions gathered under the Feminist Judgments aegis make impacts that 
resemble the thesis about progressive change I offered in The Common Law 
Inside the Female Body. The call-and-response metaphor I’ve used in this Es-
say also adverts to speech.56 
A Feminist Judgments rewriter talks to a published judicial decision, a 
source to which she necessarily has something to add. Jeanne Schroeder once 
divided jurisprudential movements into those that “give advice to the govern-
ment”—Schroeder included law and economics in that category—and those 
that take the perspective of persons who are governed, a cohort that includes 
“the speculative theorist or critical scholar.”57 Contributors to a feminist judg-
ments collection might be speculative theorists and they often are critical 
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scholars; but when they rewrite a decision they also join the advice-to-
government team, speaking about “policy.”58 
As advice-givers who want their ideas and recommendations to have in-
fluence, contributors to the Feminist Judgments initiative address what Profes-
sor Schroeder called “the government” on its own turf.59 They set out to sound 
like judges, writing opinions that announce what they concluded and why.60 As 
three Feminist Judgments leaders have described this same-and-not-the same 
methodology,61 “rewritten feminist judgments use judicial language and tone—
with all of the concomitant constraints and peculiarities—to give voice to fem-
inist resistance.”62 This approach to jurisprudence argues with precedents and 
echoes them at the same time. 
The common law follows a similar path. A different path also, I 
acknowledge as quickly as I can. Activism plays a scant role in the common law 
but it fills Feminist Judgments. Writers who contribute to these volumes feel 
uneasy about the present and even more so about the past. So do external admir-
ers of the project like me. We want judge-made law to differ from what it is. 
At the same time, an aspect shared by these two separate jurisprudential 
forces—the notion that I label “continuity meets change”—warrants mention.63 
In joining and engaging with what judges wrote into case law, rather than just 
opposing or refuting a record whose shortcomings are so tellingly told in this 
Symposium, the Feminist Judgments initiative uses primary-source instru-
ments in its agenda to transform. Ground shared by the common law and Fem-
inist Judgments is in my opinion nourishing enough to support my having 
found feminism in a conservative powdered-wig import. 
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